I Pitched My Elderly Monitoring Startup to Nearly 100 Investors. Here’s Why They All Said No

Before FAVORIOT became known for its IoT platform and Operational Visibility Platform, our first product was something very different. It was called Favorwatch, an elderly-monitoring solution that we began developing in 2017.

Favorwatch used a smartwatch to monitor the health, safety and location of elderly people living independently. Its geofencing feature could alert family members or caregivers when the wearer moved beyond a designated area. We summarised its purpose with a simple promise: “Live alone, but never be left alone.”

The product addressed a genuine social concern. Families were becoming more geographically dispersed, ageing populations were growing and wearable technologies were becoming more capable. We believed Favorwatch could help elderly people preserve their independence while giving their families greater peace of mind.

It was a meaningful idea. But a meaningful idea does not automatically become a sustainable business.

I Was Pitching the Future, Not the Evidence

During the early stages, I presented Favorwatch at accelerator demo days and pitched it directly to investors whenever opportunities appeared. I spoke about ageing populations, remote healthcare, wearable devices and the need to protect elderly people living alone.

The story was convincing, but the business was still immature. Our presentation described what Favorwatch could become, while investors wanted evidence of what it had already achieved.

I sent the pitch deck to nearly 100 venture capital firms, investors and related companies. Most never responded. A small number replied, but every response ended in rejection.

At first, I wondered whether investors simply did not understand the opportunity. We were early, the concept was uncommon and the market appeared likely to grow. With time, I realised that the problem was not necessarily their understanding of the idea.

They could see the potential. They could not see enough proof that customers were willing to pay.

Everyone Liked It Until We Discussed Payment

One of the most confusing experiences for a founder is receiving positive feedback without generating sales. Many people told us that Favorwatch was useful, meaningful and promising. They understood why families would want to protect elderly relatives through wearable monitoring.

The enthusiasm weakened when the conversation moved from appreciation to payment.

That exposed the difference between supporting an idea and buying a product. Families cared about elderly safety, but many were comfortable relying on telephone calls, relatives or existing caregiving arrangements. Healthcare organisations could recognise the value but might not have a budget, procurement route or person responsible for purchasing the solution.

People saying, “This is a good product,” sounded encouraging. It was not the same as saying, “Where do I sign, and how much should I pay?”

The Questions We Had Not Answered

Looking back, our challenge was not caused by a single mistake. Several business questions remained unresolved:

1. Who was the actual customer? The elderly person used the product, but an adult child might pay for it. A care centre might manage it, while a healthcare provider could benefit from the data.
2. Was the problem urgent enough? Elderly safety mattered, but concern did not always lead to immediate purchasing decisions.
3. Was the business model workable? Device costs, connectivity, subscriptions, support and customer service affected both the selling price and profitability.
4. Was the product ready for continuous use? A successful demonstration did not prove reliability, battery performance, network coverage or user acceptance over many months.
5. Could we demonstrate repeatable demand? We did not have enough paying customers or dependable sales channels to show that the business could grow.

These gaps made the investment risk too high. Investors were not rejecting the social purpose of Favorwatch. They were rejecting the absence of market traction.

From Favorwatch to Raqib

Favorwatch later evolved into Raqib, a monitoring solution for Hajj and Umrah pilgrims. The target market changed, but the core purpose remained: using wearable technology, location tracking and geofencing to keep people safe and connected.

The pilgrimage market offered a more specific use case. Pilgrims could become separated from their groups, experience health problems or struggle to communicate their location in crowded environments. We tested Raqib locally and with early users, and I personally tested it during Umrah.

The pivot gave us greater market clarity, but it did not remove every commercial risk. Even a focused product requires committed buyers, suitable pricing, trusted partners and good timing.

What I Would Tell My Earlier Self

If I could advise the founder who sent those 100 pitch decks, I would not tell him to stop. I would tell him to spend more time proving customer demand before seeking investment.

I would ask:

• Who owns the problem and controls the budget?
• What happens if the customer takes no action?
• Will the customer pay for a pilot?
• Can we measure the financial or operational value?
• Can we win five similar customers without rebuilding the product?
• Will the revenue cover delivery, support and future development?

Those investor rejections were painful, but they exposed weaknesses that compliments had concealed. They taught me that praise is not market validation, interest is not traction and a successful pitch is not a substitute for a paying customer.

A founder needs conviction to keep building through uncertainty. Yet conviction must eventually be supported by evidence. The market validates a product when customers commit their money, time and reputation to using it.

That was the lesson Favorwatch gave me long before FAVORIOT became the company it is today.